

Message Text

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ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 AID-05 EUR-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-03 H-02 INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 EB-07 OMB-01 /086 W

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P R 240853Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2906

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOGADISCIO 0747

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, SO

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH SOMALI AMBASSADOR ADDOU

REF: STATE 104764

1. I HAD LENGTHY DISCUSSION WITH SOMALI AMBASSADOR ADDOU MAY 23. WE DISCUSSED VARIETY OF SUBJECTS, BEGINNING WITH SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S MOST RECENT STATEMENTS ON SOVIET FACILITIES IN SOMALIA. THIS WAS FIRST ITEM PRES. SIAD RAISED WITH ADDOU IN THEIR MEETING ON MAY 18, THE EVENING OF HIS RETURN FROM US (HE VISITED KUWAIT AND JIDDA EN ROUTE).

2. SOVIET BASE ISSUE:

A. ADDOU SAID SIAD RAISED SUBJECT OF SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENTS ABOUT SOVIET BASES (STATE 116290) IN THEIR INITIAL MEETING MAY 18. FONMIN ARTEH AND VICE PRES. ISMAIL ABOKOR HAD ALSO QUESTIONED HIM ABOUT SCHLESINGER REMARKS. ADDOU SAID SIAD ANGRY AT ALLEGATIONS, WHICH WERE QUITE FALSE AND CREATING PROBLEMS FOR SOMALIA. SIAD DESPAIRED OF EVER CONVINCING SCHLESINGER OF TRUTH ABOUT SOVIET BASE CHARGES, WHICH HE HAD STEADFASTLY DENIED IN HIS TALKS WITH PRESIDENT FORD LAST OCTOBER.

B. ADDOU THEN ATTEMPTED REBUT SOVIET BASE CHARGES. HE

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SAID THAT INITIALLY SCHLESINGER HAS DESCRIBED SOVIET QTE BASES UNQTE

IN SOMALIA BUT MORE RECENTLY BASES HAD BECOME QTE FACILITIES UNQTE. SOVIET NAVAL UNITS HAD ACCESS TO BERBERA FOR SERVICING BUT THIS DID NOT RPT NOT CONSTITUTE BASE. THERE WAS NO RPT NO SOVIET QTE EQUIPMENT UNQTE AT BERBERA AND SOVIETS DID NOT RPT NOT CONTROL ANY PARCEL OF SOMALI TERRITORY.

C. ADDOU THEN DISCUSSED SECRETARY SCHLESSINGER'S STATEMENTS IN TERMS OF CREATING CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR DIEGO GARCIA APPROPRIATIONS -- ARGUMENT I'M SURE HEUSED WITH SIAD AS WELL - AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT SCHLESINGER WOULD FIND MORE QUIET AND DISCREET WAY OF COMMUNICATING HIS CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET BUILD-UP IN INDIAN OCEAN TO CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS. HE THOUGHT US SHIP VISIT TO SOMALIA -- FIRST TO MOGADISCIO, THEN TO CHIFCMAYU AND LATER BERBERA -- WOULD DO MUCH TO DISPEL MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT BERBERA (ANOTHER ARGUMENT I SUSPECT HE USED WITH SIAD IN ATTEMPTING FIND WAY TO SMOOTH OVER TROUBLESOME BERBERA ISSUE). HE WAS HOPING TO GET DATE FOR US SHIP VISIT PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE MAY 26.

D. I TOLD ADDOU I WELL UNDERSTOOD CONGRESSIONAL IMPORT OF SCHLESINGER'S STATEMENTS BUT THERE WERE OTHER FACTS HE SHOULD KNOW AS WELL. SOVIETS HAD SERVICING AND COMMUNICATIONS FACILITY AT BERBERA WHICH AVAILABLE TO SOVIET NAVAL UNITS AND NO OTHER.THESE CONSTITUTED SOVIET FACILITIES. IN ADDITION, SOVIETS WERE BUILDING MISSILE STORAGE AND/OR SERVICING FACILITY OUTSIDE BERBERA ITSELF FOR AIR-TO-SURFACE OR SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES AND US CONCERNED ABOUT THIS INSTALLATION. I DID NOT BELIEVE US SHIP VISIT WAS ANSWER TO THIS PROBLEM AT PRESENT TIME. WHETHER SOVIET INSTALLATIONS CONSTITUTED BASE OR FACILITY WAS MORE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE BUT THAT WAS NOT RPT NOT REAL ISSUE. (I SUBSEQUENTLY ASKED ADDOU WHETHER SIAD WAS CONTEMPLATING INSPECTION TRIP BY ARABS TO BERBERA DURING ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT. HE DID NOT RPT NOT KNOW AND AGAIN RAISED MATTER OF US NAVAL VISIT AND HIS ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN DATE FOR US SHIP).

3. SOMALIA'S POLITICAL ORIENTATION:

A. FOLLOWING DISCUSSION OF LEGAL BARRIERS TO RESUMPTION OF US ECONOMIC AID TO SOMALIA (SEPTTEL), ADDOU SAID HE WAS OPTIMISTIC THAT LGEAL BARRIERS WERE BEING DISMANTLED. I SAID I THOUGH THAT MIGHT BE A POSSIBILITY BUT WHAT ABOUT PHILOSOPHICAL BARRIERS? I HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT SOMALIA'S CLAIMS AS NON-ALIGNED NATION AND UNDER THOSE CONFIDENTIAL

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CIRCUMSTANCES, I WONDERED WHAT USEFUL ROLE US COULD BE EXPECTED TO PLAY IN SOMALIA. PATTERN OF SIAD'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS OVER PAST SEVERAL MONTHS SHOWED THAT HE WAS PURSUING RATHER NARROW PRO-SOVIET POLITICAL COURSE. WHILE SOMALIA'S POLITICAL ORIENTATION WAS ITS OWN BUSINESS, NEVERTHELESS EXTENT OF SOVIET INFLUENCE RAISED QUESTION ABOUT ANY FUTURE US ROLE. ONE OF MOST REVEALING OF SIAD'S RECENT SPEECHES WAS HIS STATEMENT TO PAN-AFRICAN WOMAN'S GROUP (MOGADISCIO 521). TO TAKE BOTH TIMELY AND USEFUL PARALLEL, ONE ONLY HAD TO COMPARE IT WITH

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY 11TH HUNGARIAN PARTY CONGRESS ON MARCH 21 TO IDENTIFY EXTENT OF SIAD'S PRO-SOVIET ORTHODOXY.

B. ID DIDN'T DOUBT THAT THERE WERE MANY PEOPLE IN MOGADISCIO WHO BELIEVED US COULD PLAY POSITIVE ROLE IN SOMALIA. THERE WERE MINISTERS AND GSDR OFFICIALS, PERHAPS SOME SRC MEMBERS, AS WELL AS AMBASSADORS LIKE HIMSELF WHO WERE HONESTLY PERSUADED THAT GREATER US ROLE WOULD HAVE SALUTARY EFFECT IN MODERATING SOMALIA'S POLITICAL DIRECTION. ON OTHER HAND, THERE WERE THOSE IN GSDR, IN PRESIDENCY AND IN POLITICAL OFFICE WHO CLEARLY OPPOSED US INTERESTS AND WOULD CONTINUE TO DO SO. I WONDERED WHOSE VIEW WERE MOST REALISTIC INsofar AS US FUTURE IN SOMALIA WAS CONCERNED.

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INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 AID-05 EUR-12 CIAE-00 DODE-00

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FM AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2907

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MOGADISCIO 0747

C. AS FAR AS US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE WAS CONCERNED, I THOUGHT THAT SOMALIA'S PROBLEMS WITH ARAB LEAGUE PROVIDED USEFUL TEST OF PREMISE THAT ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE COULD MODERATE SIAD'S POLITICAL ORIENTATION. ON BASIS OF MY OBSERVATIONS TO DATE, I THOUGHT THAT PREMISE QUITE FALSE. IF SIAD WOULD NOT RPT NOT MODIFY HIS MARXIST OR PRO-SOVIET ORIENTATION IN FACE OF ARABS' FINANCIAL RESOURCES, THEN WHAT HOPE WAS THERE THAT LIMITED US ECONOMIC ROLE -- OF FAR LESS POTENTIAL -- WOULD HAVE ANY EFFECT WHATSOEVER?

D. ONLY ROLE US COULD PLAY UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD BE SYMBOLIC ROLE; THAT IS TO SAY, US PRESENCE IN SOMALIA WOULD PROVIDE FICTITIOUS COUNTERWEIGHT IN MINDS OF SOMALI OFFICIALS AND AMONG OBSERVERS ABROAD TO SOVIET PRESENCE, WOULD REINFORCE SIAD'S NON-

ALIGNED IMAGE WHILE US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE -- SAY IN REHABILITATION PROGRAMS -- WAS BEING USED TO HELP MARXIST SOCIAL ENGINEERS FROM HALANE INDOCTRINATION CENTER OR POLITICAL OFFICE INCULCATE SOVIET GOSPEL AMONG DISPOSSESSED SOMALI NOMADS. I WAS TOTALLY OPPOSED TO ANY SUCH US ASSISTANCE. IF THIS WAS IN FACT SOMALIA'S INTENTION, THEN MOSCOW AND ITS SATELLITES SHOULD PAY BILLS.

4. ADDOU SAID THAT HE WAS ALSO OPPOSED TO US BEING USED IN SYMBOLIC ROLE AND WOULD NOT RPT NOT ENDORSE ANY GSDR REQUEST FOR US ASSISTANCE FOR PROJECTS WHICH SUPPORTED RADICAL OR ANTI-US POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION. ACCORDING TO ADDOU, HOWEVER, SIAD WAS ATTEMPTING TO CREATE AUTHENTIC SOMALI SOCIALISM, TO ESTABLISH SOMALIA AS TRULY CONFIDENTIAL

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INDEPENDENT NON-ALIGNED NATION. ANY UNFORTUNATE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE QUITE ERRONEOUS. IN HIS PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH ADDOU, SIAD'S INTENTIONS WERE CRYSTAL CLEAR IN THIS RESPECT.

5. REGARDING RADICAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN PRESIDENCY, ADDOU ADMITTED THAT IT EXISTED. HE SAID THAT THERE WERE ELEMENTS IN PRESIDENCY AND IN GSDR OPPOSED TO US WHO WERE PUSHING SIAD ALONG MORE RADICAL PATH (ADDOU AT NO TIME ACKNOWLEDGED PRO-SOVIET INFLUENCE). HE THOUGHT POWER OF THOSE ADVISORS NOW BROKEN (I BELIEVE HE WAS REFERRING -- AS I WAS NOT -- TO MOHAMED ADEN AND WEIRAH) AND SIAD NOW PURSUING MORE MODERATE PATH. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THIS POLITICAL MODERATION WOULD CONTINUE.

6. REGARDING SOMALIA'S RELATIONS WITH ARAB LEAGUE, ADDOU CHARACTERIZED PROBLEMS TO DATE AS FAMILY SQUABBLES BETWEEN ISLAMIC BROTHERS. HE BELIEVED THAT SIAD HAD SETTLED ALL OF HIS OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS WITH SAUDI ARABIA DURING HIS RECENT TALKS IN JIDDA AND ARAB SUMMIT WOULD TAKE PLACE IN MOGADISCIO, WITH IMPORTANT BENEFITS TO SOMALIA.

7. US WAS SPECIAL CASE, HOWEVER, WHICH AS GREAT POWER WAS NOT RPT NOT COMPARABLE EITHER TO ARAB LEAGUE OR ANY OTHER NATION OR GROUP OF NATIONS. EEC WAS ONLY WESTERN DONOR HELPING SOMALIA BUT IT HAD NO RPT NO UNIQUE IDENTITY. ONE REASON SOVIET PRESENCE IN SOMALIA SO CONSPICUOUS WAS THAT US WAS NOT RPT NOT HERE. US TO BLAME HISTORICALLY FOR SPECIAL PROMINANCE GIVEN USSR. RESUMPTION OF US ROLE

IN SOMALIA WOULD DIMINISH OVIBT PRESENCE, WOULD HELP MODERATE SOMALI POLITICAL ORIENTATION AND IN THAT WAY HELP SIAD ACHIEVE UNIQUE SOMALI SOCIALISM, TRUE INDEPENDENCE AND POLITICAL NON-ALIGNMENT.

8. HE THOUGHT BEST WAY TO PROCEED AT PRESENT WAS (A) TO INDUCE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER TO STOP TALKING PUBLICLY ABOUT SOVIET BASES AT BERBERA; (B) TO ARRANGE ADDITIONAL VISITS OF US OFFICIALS TO

SOMALIA, INCLUDING US SHIP VISIT; AND (C) FOR USG TO MAKE
CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS TO GSDR FOR PARTICIPATION IN ECONOMIC
ASSISTANCE PROJECTS DIRECTED AT DROUGHT REHABILITATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION.

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9. AMBASSADOR ADDOU IS GENTLEMAN AND DIPLOMAT, WHO REPRESENTS
ALL THAT IS MOST GRACIOUS AND SEDUCTIVE IN SOMALI POLITICAL
ESTABLISHMENT. HE WOULD PROBABLY SAY THAT I HAVE BEEN IN
MOGADISCIO TOO LONG. I WOULD ONLY SAY THAT HE HAS NOT RPT NOT BEEN
HERE LONG ENOUGH AND CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS PROBABLY ELEMENT OF
TRUTH IN BOTH PERCEPTIONS.
HAMRICK

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